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We study the relationship between pro-social preferences and strategic reasoning.
These aspects are typically studied separately but little is known about their joint
distribution. In an experiment, for each participant we elicit individual concerns toward
pro-sociality—inequality aversion and efficiency—as well as the number of steps of
reasoning through a guessing game. We report that self-regarding and pro-social
participants exhibit similar levels of strategic reasoning, which supports the view that
pro-sociality and strategic reasoning can be studied independently.
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1. Introduction
Modeling motivations in economic choices and bounded rationality have both been at the center
of a long lasting debate. The canonical model in economics deems economic agents as aiming
exclusively at personal material outcomes and acting as ﬂawless maximizers. This conceptualization
has been dubbed homo oeconomicus (Thaler and Mullainathan, 2001). Decades of research in
psychology and economics, however, have successfully challenged this view: a large body of
experimental evidence has showed that many people also respond to motivations that go beyond
the maximization of personal material outcomes (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels,
2000; Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004).
Furthermore, it has pointed out various limitations in individual rationality (e.g., Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974; Nagel, 1995; Simon, 1955; Conlisk, 1996; Blume and Easley, 2008).
This study is about how pro-social motivations relate to strategic reasoning. Our hypothesis is
that pro-social dispositions in the population are independent from levels of strategic reasoning.
We refer to this as the orthogonality hypothesis (Bostrom, 2012), which implies that naïve
and sophisticated subjects exhibit on average similar degrees of pro-sociality. If supported, it
would legitimize the parallel investigation of pro-social motivations in economic choices vs.
bounds to rationality in the forms of strategic reasoning. Hence, this study may carry a practical
implication for academic research on pro-social dispositions and strategic reasoning. However,
in the alternative hypothesis that these two traits were systematically correlated, theoretical and
empirical research may beneﬁt from understanding how they relate.
To test this hypothesis, we take individual measures of some well-deﬁned pro-social motivations
and study their link with the level of strategic reasoning in an experiment with students. To
study pro-sociality we employ two dictator games (Engelmann and Strobel, 2004) and to measure
strategic reasoning we use a guessing game (Nagel, 1995). Dictator games are appropriate for
our purpose because they enable us to identify speciﬁc aspects of pro-social preferences while
controlling for strategic reasoning. In such games, strategic considerations play no role because
only one subject decides and the other persons are passive recipients. Moreover, through a
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guessing game one can explore strategic reasoning independently
from pro-social concerns, because the total group earnings
remain the same irrespective of participants choices, and because
the predicted equilibrium strategy is identical for self-regarding
and for pro-social participants.
In the literature, strategic reasoning has been studied in
relation to cognitive skills and the ﬁndings mostly suggest that
it correlates with many other measures of rationality. There is
experimental evidence that subjects who choose lower numbers
in guessing games exhibit higher scores in a psychometric test
of cognitive ability (Burnham et al., 2009), better performance
in a Raven test (Gill and Prowse, 2014), are better at learning
tasks (Agranov et al., 2013), exhibit higher scores in a Cognitive
Reﬂection Test (Brañas-Garza et al., 2012; Carpenter et al., 2013),
and score higher on the SAT and ACT (Carpenter et al., 2013).
Some experiments studied other dimensions of strategic
reasoning: making few reasoning errors in a beauty contest game
appears positively related to the performance on the Operation
Span test (Rydval et al., 2009). Instead, Georganas et al. (2014)
report no signiﬁcant relationship between level-k playing and
scores in various cognitive tests: IQ, Eye Gaze test for adult
autism, Wechsler digit span working memory test, and Cognitive
Reﬂection Test. Coricelli and Nagel (2009) ﬁnd that strategic
reasoning is possibly a separate and independent ability from
computational skills.
The relationship between some of these cognitive abilities
and pro-social dispositions has received some attention in the
literature. Choices in dictator games have generally been put into
relation with performance in tests of cognitive skills of various
types (post-session survey, schoolmath scores, Raven Progressive
Matrix test, test of cognitive load, SAT). While some studies
report that dictators with high cognitive skills give lower amounts
to recipients (Millet and Dewitte, 2007; Chen et al., 2013), others
report the opposite (Brandstatter and Guth, 2002; Ben-Ner et al.,
2004; Benjamin et al., 2013), or ﬁnd unclear eﬀects (Hauge et al.,
2009).
To the best of our knowledge, this is among the ﬁrst
contributions that studies the relationship between strategic
reasoning using choices in a guessing game and pro-sociality
in a dictator game with three players. The two closest studies
are Bayer and Renou (2011)and Dittrich and Leipold (2014).
The former studies the relationship between strategic reasoning
using incentivized written accounts describing the reasoning
behind choices instead of actual choices in the guessing game
and choices in a standard two-person dictator and a trust game.
They ﬁnd that subjects following higher steps of reasoning are less
pro-social than subjects following zero steps. Bayer and Renou
(2011) employ a Dirty Faces Game to elicit the level of strategic
reasoning and a dictator game to control for pro-sociality. Their
focus is on how subjects play strategic-form games and do not
report the direct correlation between strategic reasoning and pro-
sociality. The present study yields two original results. First, it
provides a more complete mapping of pro-sociality by expanding
the scope of pro-social motivations under study. The standard
two-person dictator game only captures the level of generosity,
the degree of aversion to advantageous inequality (Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999). In our modiﬁed dictator games, we elicit
individual measures about the concern for advantageous and
disadvantageous inequality as well as of concerns for eﬃciency—
the willingness to give up personal earnings in order to increase
overall group earnings. Second, it focuses on strategic reasoning,
which is elicited in an incentivized way. We ﬁnd that there is
no systematic relationship between pro-sociality and strategic
reasoning: Subjects appears to be distributed independently
across these two dimensions as suggested by the orthogonality
hypothesis.
This study leaves out some pro-social motivations such as
positive and negative reciprocity or guilt aversion (Levine,
1998; Ghidoni and Ploner, 2014). Although these are
important behavioral considerations, we have not included
these motivations because they contain both pro-social and
strategic aspects. Hence, we report here only some measures
of pro-sociality and compare them with strategic reasoning.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the
experimental design, Section 3 reports results, and Section 4
discusses results and concludes.
2. Materials and Methods
We recruited 195 students from Purdue University using in-
class announcements and then asking them to sign-up online
through theORSEE platform (Greiner, 2004). A session consisted
of three parts. The ﬁrst part consisted of two tasks aimed at
eliciting pro-social preferences along the lines of Engelmann
and Strobel (2004). The second part included a guessing game
(Nagel, 1995) aimed at assessing participants depth of strategic
reasoning. The third part comprises a series of modiﬁed trust
games. In a companion paper—Arruñada and Casari (2013)—we
report on the third part and employ part one and two simply as
controls. There we do not discuss the results of the ﬁrst two parts,
which is done here. Complete instructions including part three
are available upon request to the authors.
At the outset, every participant had to submit a choice in each
one of the two dictator games described in Table 1. Each dictator
game proposed a choice between alternative allocations of money
within a group of three: Person 1, Person 2, and Person 3. The
dictator (Person 2) decided among three available options: A, B,
and C in game 1 and D, E, and F in game 2. Choices were made
though pen-and-paper.
We followed the strategy method. Every participant made
choices as if she was the dictator: she should imagine to be
Person 2 and assign to the other two members of the group
the earnings related to Person 1 and Person 3 as reported in
Table 1. All participants wrote their choices on a decision card
that was marked with their anonymous identiﬁcation number.
The experimenter collected the cards, shuﬄed them, randomly
formed groups, and followed the procedure described below to
determine the individual payments. In each group, the decision
card of one member was randomly selected to be Person 2 and
the other two were assigned to Person 1 and 3. The card of the
participant that was randomly selected as Person 2 was used
to deﬁne the earnings in the group. Participants were informed
that their decision would be implemented only if their card was
randomly selected to be Person 2. The choices of the participant
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TABLE 1 | Dictator and Guessing games.
Dictator games (1) Equality vs. (2) Efficiency vs.
Self-regard Self-regard
A B C D E F
Person 1 8 11 12 20.5 12 7.5
Person 2 (dictator) 8 8.5 9 6.5 7 7.5
Person 3 8 4.5 3 5 5 5
Total payoffs 24 24 24 32 24 20
Predictions:
Self-regard x x
Efficiency x x x x
Inequality aversion x x
Maximin x x x x
Experimental choices (N = 195)
N of participants 94 27 74 100 32 63
Percentage 48.2 13.8 37.9 51.3 16.4 32.3
Guessing game (min 0, max 100)
Predictions: 0 = Nash equilibrium
Experimental choices (N = 195)
Mean guess 42.7 39.0 39.7 39.6 44.6 41.6
Median guess 38.0 36.0 37.5 35.5 41.6 42.0
selected as Person 1 and Person 3 had no impact on the outcome.
Half of the groups were paid according to choices made for the
ﬁrst dictator game and the other half to choices related to the
second dictator game.
Table 1 lists the predictions according to various criteria. The
predicted outcomes for inequality aversion are coherent with two
widely employed economic models of pro-sociality (Engelmann
and Strobel, 2004).
To measure depth of strategic reasoning, we then introduced
a one-shot guessing game. All participants had to write a real
number between 0 and 100 on their personal decision cards. They
were informed that groups of three would be randomly formed,
and then a target number for each group would be computed by
taking two thirds of the group average. Within each group, the
participant closest to her target number received 6 points, which
were evenly split in case of a tie. After every participant made a
choice, the experimenter collected all decision cards and wrote
the results for both tasks on the cards, and returned them to the
participants who learned the results of these tasks at the end of
the session.
Earnings were paid privately at the end of a session summing
the points of all parts of the experiment: cash payments
varied depending on the outcome according to the publicly
announced rate of 0.45USD for every point earned. Experimental
instructions for the ﬁrst and second parts are in the Appendix.
All sessions were conducted in conformity with the relevant US
regulatory standards. In particular, this study has obtained the
approval of the IRB committee of Purdue University.
Each participant was present in only one session. There were a
total of 16 sessions. A session included between 6 and 18 subjects.
A session lasted on average less than 2 h (this also includes the
third part of the experiment), including instruction reading. A
participant earned on average $24.
In dictator game 1, the best choices for a self-regarding agent
is option C. Choosing A or B reveals a willingness to forgo
personal earnings to achieve a pro-social outcome: this would
show a concern for equality. In dictator game 2, F maximizes
the dictators earnings. Choosing D or E reveals a willingness to
sacriﬁce personal earnings to increase group overall earnings,
which indicates a concern for eﬃciency—the pro-social outcome.
We have identiﬁed the best choice according to some criteria that
the subjects may want to follow (Table 1). These criteria include
two widely employed economic models of pro-sociality, which
codify inequality averse preferences (see Engelmann and Strobel,
2004 for a discussion).
The guessing game has a unique Nash equilibrium. It can
be found by the iterated deletion of dominated strategies. This
solving procedure predicts that a sophisticated player never
chooses values larger than 66.66 (= 100 × 2/3), no matter what
others chose. If everyone does so, then strategic reasoning would
suggest to eliminate values larger than 44.44 (= 100 × (2/3)2).
Further iterations of this type of reasoning, will lead everyone to
choose 0, which is the Nash equilibrium.
3. Results
In this Section we present the raw choices separately for each
task—dictator and guessing games—and then in relation to one
another. In the dictator game about 37.9% of the participants
chose C and 32.3% chose F (Table 1): these choices reveal that
only a minority of participants ﬁt the predictions of a self-
regarding agent. These results are in line with previous studies
reporting the pro-sociality dispositions of a sizable share of the
population (e.g., Güth et al., 2001; Andreoni and Miller, 2002).
On the guessing game, individual guesses thoroughly spread
from 0 through 100 (Figure 1). Other experiments with the
guessing game adopted multipliers of 1/2 or 2/3 and obtained
similar results (e.g., Nagel, 1995; Coricelli and Nagel, 2009). Note
that the same equilibrium of zero holds for any game with a
multiplier strictly below 1. We report data about choices in the
guessing game classiﬁed according to the implicit number of steps
of reasoning as in an Iterated Dominance solution model (ID, see
Bosch-Domenech et al., 2002).
To study the relationships between levels of strategic
reasoning and pro-sociality, we compared the revealed level of
pro-sociality and the patterns of guesses.
In Figure 2 and inTable 2we represent the fraction of subjects
choosing options A and C in the dictator game subdivided by
steps of reasoning in the guessing game.
In the left panel one can see that those who chose the pro-
social option A and those who chose the self-regarding option
C in dictator game 1 are a roughly constant share in each step
of reasoning. In the right panel one can see that those who
chose option D vs. F in game 2 do not vary systematically across
step of reasoning. These ﬁndings are supported by a series of
probit regressions, which show a lack of signiﬁcant pro-sociality
diﬀerences among decision makers characterized by distinct
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FIGURE 1 | Distribution of choices in the guessing game.
FIGURE 2 | Pro-social concerns and steps of strategic reasoning.
Fraction of participants choosing A(C) or D(F) in dictator games computed
separately on clusters of participants classified in the same step of reasoning.
TABLE 2 | Joint choices in dictator and guessing games (number of
participants).
Step 0 Step 1 Step 2 Higher steps
(66.66–100) (44.44–66.66) (29.63–44.44) (0–29.63) Totals
DICTATOR GAME 1
A 14 23 35 22 94
B 4 7 6 10 27
C 10 19 24 21 74
DICTATOR GAME 2
D 13 22 34 31 100
E 7 6 11 8 32
F 8 21 20 14 63
Totals 28 49 65 53 195
steps of reasoning (Table 3). The dependent variable of these
regressions takes value 1 when the participant chose a speciﬁc
option in a dictator game (A, C, D, or F). The regressors are TA
B
LE
3
|P
ro
-s
o
ci
al
p
re
fe
re
nc
es
an
d
st
ra
te
g
ic
re
as
o
ni
ng
.
D
ep
.v
ar
ia
b
le
C
ho
ic
e
fo
r
se
lf-
re
g
ar
d
(C
)
C
ho
ic
e
fo
r
eq
ua
lit
y
(A
)
C
ho
ic
e
fo
r
se
lf-
re
g
ar
d
(F
)
C
ho
ic
e
fo
r
ef
fi
ci
en
cy
(D
)
S
te
p
1
0.
08
1
0.
08
1
−0
.0
77
−0
.0
77
0.
38
6
0.
38
6
−0
.0
39
−0
.0
39
(0
.3
03
)
(0
.3
03
)
(0
.2
97
)
(0
.2
97
)
(0
.3
09
)
(0
.3
09
)
(0
.2
98
)
(0
.2
98
)
S
te
p
2
0.
03
2
0.
09
7
0.
06
4
0.
14
8
(0
.2
90
)
(0
.2
83
)
(0
.2
99
)
(0
.2
84
)
H
ig
he
r
S
te
ps
0.
10
3
−0
.2
14
−0
.0
65
0.
30
4
(0
.2
99
)
(0
.2
94
)
(0
.3
12
)
(0
.2
94
)
S
te
p
2
or
H
ig
he
r
0.
06
4
−0
.0
42
0.
00
7
0.
21
7
(0
.2
70
)
(0
.2
63
)
(0
.2
79
)
(0
.2
64
)
S
te
p
1
or
H
ig
he
r
0.
06
9
−0
.0
53
0.
12
4
0.
14
2
(0
.2
62
)
(0
.2
56
)
(0
.2
71
)
(0
.2
56
)
C
on
st
an
t
−0
.3
66
−0
.3
66
−0
.3
66
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
−0
.5
66
**
−0
.5
66
**
−0
.5
66
**
−0
.0
90
−0
.0
90
−0
.0
90
(0
.2
43
)
(0
.2
43
)
(0
.2
43
)
(0
.2
37
)
(0
.2
37
)
(0
.2
37
)
(0
.2
51
)
(0
.2
51
)
(0
.2
51
)
(0
.2
37
)
(0
.2
37
)
(0
.2
37
)
Lo
g
lik
el
ih
oo
d
−1
29
.3
60
−1
29
.4
08
−1
29
.4
05
−1
34
.1
11
−1
35
.0
04
−1
35
.0
01
−1
20
.9
34
−1
21
.0
69
−1
22
.5
81
−1
33
.9
99
−1
34
.2
25
−1
34
.9
54
P
ro
bi
tm
od
el
s
w
ith
re
gr
es
so
rs
du
m
m
y
va
ria
bl
es
fo
rt
he
S
te
ps
of
re
as
on
in
g
of
th
e
ID
m
od
el
.T
he
de
fa
ul
tv
al
ue
of
st
ra
te
gi
c
re
as
on
in
g
is
S
te
p
0.
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
te
st
im
at
es
w
ith
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
.S
ta
tis
tic
al
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e:
**
*1
%
,*
*5
%
,*
10
%
.N
um
be
r
of
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
is
19
5
in
al
lm
od
el
s.
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 4 May 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 140
Arruñada et al. Pro-sociality and strategic reasoning
a list of dummy variables that codify the number of steps of
reasoning according to the ID model. As a robustness check, one
speciﬁcation contrasts Step 0 vs. more than 0, another separate
Step 0 from Step 1 and cluster Step 2 or higher, while another
considers all four step category separately. In each of these three
econometric speciﬁcations—within the four options A, C, D,
and F—we do not ﬁnd a relationship between pro-sociality and
strategic reasoning.
One can also jointly consider the two choices in the
dictator games. This allows us to identify strictly self-regarding
participants as those who chose C and F (n = 42, 21.5%),
and strongly pro-social as those who chose A and D (n = 63,
32.3%). These two categories of participants are less likely to
be classiﬁed as self-regarding or pro-social by pure chance. A
series of probit regressions on the joint choices generally reveals
no correlation between being self-interest or pro-social and the
number of steps of reasoning (Table 4). An exception is the
higher fraction of self-regarding choices for those classiﬁed as
Step 1 reasoning over Step 0, which is weakly signiﬁcant (see
columns (1) and (2) in Table 4). In addition, we performed a
variety of robustness checks with diﬀerent speciﬁcations that
include as additional observations the intermediate choices (B,
E), or employ another set of regressors for the level of strategic
reasoning, or follow an alternative classiﬁcation of individuals
in terms of strategic reasoning (for instance the Iterated Best
Reply model, as of Nagel, 1995, see Online Supplementary
Material).
To sum up, the evidence outlined in this Section supports two
main results.
Result 1. The fraction of participants who prefer equality over
self-regard is similar across steps of reasoning.
Result 2. The fraction of participants who prefer eﬃciency over
self-regard is similar across steps of reasoning.
4. Discussion
In this paper we classify participants according to a proxy
of their depth of strategic reasoning in a guessing game, and
then considered their pro-social dispositions as revealed in
two dictator games. The evaluation of pro-sociality considers
both concerns for equality and eﬃciency, which are aspects
that currently play a central role in the social sciences within
the debate about motivations for economic behavior (Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999; Bolton andOckenfels, 2000; Andreoni andMiller,
2002; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004;
Rand et al., 2012).
We report that the level of strategic reasoning has no
signiﬁcant relationship with pro-sociality. In particular,
participants with a low ability to perform strategic reasoning
exhibit similar degrees of pro-sociality than others, which
suggests that deviations from the self-regarding behavior appears
to be a purposeful action. One practical implication of this
result is that scholars can proceed in parallel in the investigation
of pro-social motivations in economic choices vs. bounds to
rationality in the forms of strategic reasoning.
Arguably, strategic reasoning is only a speciﬁc dimension
within the assumption of rationality in economic behavior.
As suggested by an anonymous referee, by focusing on
game-theoretical procedures to solve the game, we provide a
computational account of the cognitive process underlying the
actual decision-making. A more systematic test of the initial
conjectures could include also other dimensions of rationality,
such as numeracy ability, IQ, ability to deal with cognitive loads,
consistency in choices, which are not explored in this paper.
The implications of our ﬁndings are at the moment limited
to strategic reasoning and not to the more encompassing
assumption of rationality. Although somewhat speciﬁc, strategic
reasoning is a cognitive process with wide applications in
economic settings. Whenever individuals are asked to reason
iteratively and think inductively, strategic reasoning is at play
TABLE 4 | Pro-social preferences and strategic reasoning (combined).
Dep. variable Choice for self-regard (C and F) Choice for pro-social (A and D)
Step 1 0.676* 0.676* −0.061 −0.061
(0.369) (0.369) (0.316) (0.316)
Step 2 0.454 0.313
(0.362) (0.296)
Higher steps 0.427 0.047
(0.372) (0.310)
Step 2 or Higher 0.442 0.197
(0.342) (0.278)
Step 1, 2 or Higher 0.515 0.124
(0.334) (0.271)
Constant −1.242*** −1.242*** −1.242*** −0.566** −0.566** −0.566**
(0.317) (0.317) (0.317) (0.251) (0.251) (0.251)
Log-likelihood −99.780 −99.786 −100.300 −121.305 −121.922 −121.581
Probit models with regressors dummy variables for the Steps of reasoning of the ID model. The default value of strategic reasoning is Step 0. Coefficient estimates with standard errors
in parentheses are reported. Statistical significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. Number of observations is 195 in all models.
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(Carpenter et al., 2013). Consider for instance the choice to save
for retirement or how much to invest in education. Moreover,
when others’ behavior is relevant for personal outcome, because
interaction is at play, both personal strategic ability and the ability
to assess the strategic sophistication of others is crucial.
An important qualiﬁcation related to the ability to predict
others’ levels of reasoning is required in our design. The
classiﬁcation of participants by depth of reasoning presents
indeed limitations: according to the Iterative Dominance model
(ID), while any choice equal or above 66.7 is a clear sign of lack of
strategic reasoning, any choice less than 66.7 can be rationalized,
by assuming a speciﬁc belief about what others will do. As
we do not observe individual beliefs, we cannot rule out those
values as unreasonable. Hence, a high guess either characterizes
participants with low steps of reasoning or those who believe that
everybody else is unable perform strategic reasoning (Coricelli
and Nagel, 2009).
We interpret the data according to the former view and
hence assume that there is a positive correlation between the
level of strategic reasoning of a person and her belief about the
level of strategic reasoning of the others. Finally, the assessment
of the individual level of strategic reasoning is tied to the use
of a particular model, in this case the ID model. Alternative
classiﬁcations in steps are possible and codify diﬀerent reasoning
protocols, for instance the Iterated Best Reply model (IBR,
see Nagel, 1995). Nevertheless, our results do not substantially
change if the IBR model is used (see Online Supplementary
Material). Possible robustness checks for this result include
using an improved classiﬁcation in steps of reasoning that
employs elicited self-assessment of individual reasoning
process, beliefs, or other information. We leave this to future
research.
In summary, our evidence suggests no direct relationship
between pro-social concerns and the ability to perform strategic
reasoning.
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